


The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership: Building Partner Capacity to Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism

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Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership

- TSCTP is the U.S. Government's *multi-year, interagency*, and *regional* initiative to build the capacity and resilience of the governments and communities in the Sahel and Maghreb regions of Africa to contain, disrupt, degrade, and ultimately defeat the threat posed by al-Qaida, its affiliates, and associated violent extremist organizations
- Pan-Sahel Initiative (2002-2004) → TSCTP (2005-present)
- State, DoD, & USAID main USG stakeholders; DoJ to lesser extent
- \$90M - \$160M funding per year
- Sahel-Maghreb Strategy & TSCTP Review (2013)



- TSCTP Countries
- Potential Expansion of TSCTP

Functional Areas of TSCTP Engagement

- **Military Capacity-Building**
 - Train and equip partner nation CT forces to “Find, Fix, & Finish” VEOs; Increase regional security cooperation.
- **Law Enforcement Anti-Terrorism Capacity-Building**
 - Train and equip partner nation law enforcement entities to secure borders against trafficking of drugs, people, and other contraband.
- **Justice Sector Counterterrorism Capacity-Building**
 - Strengthen and harmonize CT legislation, counter transnational organized crime (including increasing anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing capacity).
- **Public Diplomacy / Information Operations**
 - Reduce the spread of violent extremist ideology, encourage moderation and tolerance in partner nations, and encourage populations to cooperate with law enforcement and military.
- **Community Engagement**
 - Key leader, youth, and civil society engagement to mitigate conflict & counter violent extremism; Also includes MEDCAPs & VETCAPs.
- **Vocational Training**
 - Increase opportunities for social and economic inclusion of out-of-school youth to mitigate VEO recruitment of marginalized populations.

Limitations of TSCTP & Way Ahead

- TSCTP presents USG w/ Catch-22
 - Narrow CT/CVE focus is a function of vital, albeit limited U.S. interests
 - Insufficient focus on potential drivers of instability not related to CT
 - Drivers of instability can detract from overall effectiveness of program (i.e., Tuareg rebellion & coup in Mali)
- Mali was failure of U.S. engagement writ large, not of TSCTP
 - Missed indicators that trouble was brewing, but, w/narrow CT/CVE focus, TSCTP lacked the scope or the scale to address potential drivers of instability
- Should TSCTP be expanded?
 - Unlikely due to limited U.S. interests in the region & current IA absorptive capacity

Imperative to link TSCTP to broader partner nation, USG, bilateral, & multilateral initiatives